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Abstract
This paper analyzes processing problem s and related  cooperative games. 
In a processing problem  there is a finite set of jobs, each requiring a specific 
am ount of effort to  be com pleted, whose costs depend linearly on their com­
pletion times. There are no restrictions w hatsoever on the  processing schedule. 
The m ain feature of the model is a capacity  restriction, i.e., there is a m axim um  
am ount of effort per tim e un it available for handling jobs.
Assigning to  each job a player and le tting  each player have an individual 
capacity  for handling jobs, each coalition of cooperating players in fact faces a 
processing problem  w ith the coalitional capacity  being the sum  of the  individual 
capacities of the  members. The corresponding processing game sum m arizes the 
m inim al jo in t costs for every coalition. It tu rn s  out th a t processing games are 
to ta lly  balanced. An explicit core element is constructed.
K eyw ords: scheduling, individual capacity, cooperation, core allocation. 
JE L  C lassifica tion  N u m b ers : C63, C71.
1 Introduction
Consider the situation in which a number of jobs has to be completed, each requiring 
its own amount of effort, and in which there is a capacity constraint to process jobs.
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2D epartm ent of M athem atics, University of Nijmegen, Toernooiveld 1, 6525 ED Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands.
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The terminology has been chosen very general in order to let several interpretations 
fit. Jobs can involve maintenance problems, the manufacturing of products, com­
putational tasks, or investments under periodic budget raises. Capacity constraints 
can be induced by limited availability of labor and/or engine power, by periodic 
supplies of raw material, by maximum computational speed of a computer facility, 
or by budget. In these examples, effort represents performance of men and/or ma­
chinery, or volumes of raw material, calculations or money. In all cases, capacity 
means the maximum available effort per time unit. It is assumed tha t for each time 
unit tha t a job is uncompleted, a fixed cost has to be paid. The objective is to 
find a processing schedule, taking the capacity constraint into account, to perform 
all jobs such tha t the total costs are minimized. There are no restrictions on the 
schedule with respect to, for instance, pre-emption, semi-activeness or serial vs par­
allel planning. We have baptized this type of problem a processing problem with 
restricted capacity or processing problem for short.
It turns out that in order to minimize costs in a processing problem with restricted 
capacity, the jobs have to be performed one by one. So, until all jobs have been 
completed, all capacity should be used on one job at a time. Thus, it suffices to 
find an optimal order on the jobs. From this observation it follows tha t from an 
operations research point of view, processing problems with restricted capacity and 
the well-known sequencing problems with one machine and aggregated (weighted) 
completion times are equivalent. Applying Smith’s rule (Smith (1956)), i.e. process 
the jobs in the order of decreasing urgencies, provides in both problems an optimal 
order on the jobs. Here, the urgency of a job is defined to be its cost-coefficient 
divided by its processing demand.
However, the problems diverge when analyzed in a cooperative game theory frame­
work. Problems are extended to situations in which each job belongs to a (different) 
player and each player has a personal capacity to handle jobs. Besides minimizing 
total costs, costs have to be allocated to each player individually. In order to find 
fair allocations, a cooperative game is constructed. The approach to associate a co­
operative game to an operation research problem is quite common in the literature 
(see Borm, Hamers and Hendrickx (2001) for an overview). Sequencing problems 
with one machine have been analyzed from a game-theoretical point of view in sev­
eral ways, starting from the basic paper by Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs (1989) (see 
Curiel, Hamers and Klijn (2002) for an overview). In this paper we associate games 
to processing situations. These games are called processing games (with restricted 
capacities) and differ from sequencing games. This diversion is due to two main 
differences between a processing and a sequencing situation. The first difference 
is tha t in a processing situation the players have individual and generally different 
capacities to handle jobs, while in a sequencing situation with one machine there
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are no individual capacities: in fact, the machine processes all jobs with a constant 
capacity. The second difference is that in a processing situation with restricted 
capacities there is no fixed initial order in which the jobs stand in line in front of a 
machine. So, in a processing situation there are no initial restrictions nor rights on 
the order in which players may process their jobs.
Let us elaborate on the way players can cooperate in processing situations with 
restricted capacities. If a coalition is formed, costs savings can be made by helping 
each other by means of using a player’s capacity to speed up the job of another 
coalition member. To put it differently, the members of the coalition have to their 
disposal the sum of their individual capacities in order to complete all jobs of the 
coalition. This situation can be modelled as a processing problem and as a result 
one can easily determine an optimal schedule and its costs. However, the problem of 
minimizing the total costs is supplemented with the problem of dividing these costs 
among the players involved. The latter is of a typical game theoretical nature and 
in order to solve it, we analyze the complete processing game with respect to core 
elements. Here, a processing game is a cooperative cost-game, in which the costs 
of a coalition equal the costs of an optimal schedule of its corresponding processing 
problem.
The main result of this paper states that every processing game with restricted 
capacities is totally balanced, i.e., every subgame of a processing game has a non­
empty core. To prove this statement, we construct from a given processing situation 
an exchange economy with land. In this Debreu-type of exchange economy (Debreu 
(1959)) each player initially owns a part of a perfectly divisible two dimensional 
commodity, referred to as land. One dimension is time and the other one is effort per 
time unit. In the context of processing situations, one can interpret this commodity 
as an agenda. In order to complete their jobs, players must make reservations 
in the agenda, i.e., a player must book a block of time and capacity, which is 
sufficiently large to complete his job. A price is introduced such that the market 
clears, i.e., no part of the agenda is booked by more than one player. Clearing 
the market will, as usual, lead to a price equilibrium. From this price equilibrium, 
we construct an allocation contained in the core of the processing game. Hence, 
we explicitly provide a core allocation for every processing game. Since a subgame 
of a processing game is again a processing game, we obtain totally balancedness. 
Furthermore, an interpretation of this core allocation is included, along with a proof 
tha t this core allocation is independent on which optimal schedule is chosen (in case 
of coinciding urgencies). As a consequence, the allocation x  depends continuously 
on the processing times, capacities and costs coefficients.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the formal model of
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a processing problem with restricted capacity. Section 3 studies total balancedness 
of processing games. Section 4 provides a proof for the main result, following the 
line described above.
2 P rocessing problem s w ith  restricted  capacity
A processing problem with restricted capacity P  can be described formally by a 
tuple
{J,p =  (pj )j e j , a  =  (a j  )j e j  , p ) .
Here, J  is a finite set of jobs that need to be completed. The vector p  in R+ contains 
the processing demands or efforts of the jobs, furthermore a  in R+ is the vector of 
cost coefficients and 3  is a strictly positive real denoting the maximum available 
effort per time unit, or shortly capacity. The costs for job j  to be uncompleted for 
a period of time t  equals aj - t .  A feasible schedule can be described by a map
F  : J  x  R+ — > R+,
with the following properties:
(i) F ( j , t )  : R+ — > R+ is continuous and weakly increasing in t  for all j  £ J ,
(ii) [F (j, t) — F( j ,  s)] <  3 ' (t — s) for every s , t  £  R+ with s <  t. 
j^ J
The value F(j ,  t) for job j  in J  at time t  in R+, can be interpreted as the cumulative 
amount of effort which has been used for job j  up to time t. Property (ii) states that 
for each segment [s, t] of time, the total effort spend on all jobs together is restricted 
linearly in the length of the segment by the capacity constraint. We denote F  as 
the family of all feasible schedules. Given a feasible schedule F  in F , the completion 
t ime Tj ( F ) of job j  in J  is defined by
T j ( F ) := inf{t £  R+ | F ( j , t )  > p3}.
We allow Tj ( F ) to be infinity. The objective is to find a feasible schedule such that 
the sum of costs over all jobs is minimized. This minimum is expressed by
c(P)  :=  min ^  a j T j ( F ) . 
jeJ
Observe that the minimum exists and therefore the value c(P ) is well-defined for 
every processing problem P .
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E x am p le  2.1. Suppose, a farmer has to harvest three acres with different types 
of crop, say type 1, 2 and 3. The tasks require 20, 30 and 10 days of work for 
one man respectively. His workforce consists of himself and 5 employees. He has 
contracts with distributors to deliver the types of crop, but he is already over time. 
Every extra day of delay results in penalties of size 24, 30 and 6 respectively. The 
farmer wants to harvest the acres in such a way tha t the total sum of penalties will be 
minimal. This problem can be modelled as the processing problem P  := {J , p , a, 3), 
in which J  := {1, 2, 3}, p  := (20, 30,10), a  := (24, 30, 6) and 3  := 6 .
One approach to complete the jobs, is dividing the capacity 3  over the jobs pro­
portionally to their processing demands. Then after 10 days all jobs are finished 
simultaneously. This approach corresponds with the schedule F  defined as follows:
F (1,t) := 2■t , F (2,t)  := 3■ t  and F (3,t)  := t  for all t  G R+.
It yields a total cost of 600. Another approach is to finish the jobs one after another. 
If the jobs are done in the order (1,2,3), the corresponding schedule F ' will be
F '(1 ,t)  : =  
F '(2, t) : =
F  '(3, t) : =
6 • t if 6-t E [0 , 20],
20 if 6-t > 20,
0 if 6-t E [0, 20],
6 -t -  20 if 6-t E [20, 50]
30 if 6 -t > 50,
0 if 6-t E [0, 50],
6 -t -  50 if 6 -t E [50, 60]
10 if 6-1 > 60.
The schedule F'  induces completion times T (F ' ) =  (20, 50> 10), which yield a total 
cost of 390. o
In the example above is already illustrated tha t it may be profitable to use the 
total capacity for exactly one job at a time. We will now demonstrate tha t in order 
to minimize aggregate costs in an arbitrary processing problem, one should indeed 
choose this approach. To do so, we first need some preparations.
Let a  : { 1 ,. . . ,  \ J |} — > J  be a bijection. It can be seen as the order in which the 
jobs in J  are completed, i.e., the job at position j  in the order a  is denoted by 
a ( j ). We write n ( J ) for the family of all such bijections. In case the jobs in J  are
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completed in the order a, we get as corresponding schedule F a : J  x  R+ — ► R+.
F a (a ( j  ) , t )  :=
0 if 3  ■ t < E  Pa(k),
k<j
3  ■ t - E  Pa(k) if E Pa(k) < 3  ■t < E  Pa(k), 
k<j k<j k<j
Pa(j) if E Pa(k) < 3  ■t.
k<j
L em m a 2.1. There exists a bijection a e  n ( J ) such that  E  a j ■Tj(Fa ) =  c(P ).
jeJ
P ro o f. Let F  e  F  be an optimal schedule, then T j ( F ) < to  for all j  in J . Let 
a e  n ( J ) be a bijection such that
T<r(l)(F) < T(j(2) (F) < ••• < Ta(\J |)(F  ) -
For 1 < j  < \ J \  we have
T (j)(F) — 1 ^  Pa(k) =  Ta(j)(F  ) . 
k=l
This yields
IJI IJI
c(P) =  a °(j) ■ Tv(j)(F) — a &(j) 'Tv(j)(F  ) . 
j= l j= l
Hence, c (P ) =  min E  a i ■Tj(Fa ). □
aen(J) jeJ
This result in fact shows tha t a processing problem boils down to a sequencing 
problem with one machine. The processing time of a job j  can be found by dividing 
the processing demand Pj by the capacity constraint 3 . Therefore, the optimal 
schedule can be found by applying the well-known S m i th ’s rule, i.e. process the 
jobs in the order of decreasing urgencies, in which the urgency of job j  in J  is given 
by ^ .J pj
P ro p o s itio n  2.2. [cf. Smith (1956)] Let P  be a processing problem such that
J  =  {1, . . . ,  \J\} and the jobs are numbered such that a i  — ■ ■ ■ — . Then it ispi — — p\j \
optimal to process the jobs in increasing order and
IJI
c(P ) =  ai ■ Pi  + . . .  +  Pi]. □
i=l
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3 P rocessing gam es w ith  restricted  capacities
In this section we introduce processing situations with restricted capacities and 
associated processing games. Examples are provided and the main theorem of the 
paper is stated: processing games are totally balanced. An explicit core element is 
provided.
In a processing situation ( N , J , p  =  (pj) je J , a  =  ( a j ) j e J , (3i)ieN) there is a finite 
set of players N , in which each player i in N  is endowed with a strictly positive 
capacity 3 i , in order to perform jobs. Each job j  in J  has a processing demand pj  
and cost coefficient a j , both in R + . As long as job j  is uncompleted, it generates a 
cost of size a j  per time unit. Each player has to complete one specific job in J . 
Since each player is obliged to a different job, there is a one-one correspondence 
between players an jobs and no confusion occurs when the processing demand and 
the cost coefficient of the job of player i are denoted by pi and a i respectively. 
This one-one correspondence simplifies notations and proofs, but is not essential for 
our results. The model can be extended to situations in which players are obliged 
to several jobs or jobs are in the interest of several players. These generalizations 
lie beyond the scope of this paper and will be studied in Quant, Meertens and 
Reijnierse (2004).
Let S  C N  be a coalition of players who decide to cooperate. This coalition has 
the disposal of the individual capacities of all of its members, i.e., coalition S  can 
maximally generate an amount of effort of size 3 ( S ) := E ■ies 3% per time unit. The 
aim of coalition S  is to complete all jobs of its members, such tha t aggregate costs 
are minimized. This situation gives rise to the processing problem
P (S) := (J (S ) ,  (pi)i€s , ( a i ) i e s , 3 ( S )),
in which J (S) denotes the set of jobs corresponding to players in S . Proposition 2.2 
provides a method to calculate an optimal schedule such that the aggregate costs 
of coalition S  are minimized. However, constructing such a schedule is only part of 
the problem. That is, in addition to minimizing total costs, the problem remains 
how to allocate these costs among the players in S  in a fair way. To study this 
problem, we analyze a processing game (N, cP ) in which cP : 2N — > R+ is the map 
defined by
cP (S) := c ( P (S)) for all S C N.
The processing game (N, cP ) is a so-called cost-game. A cost-game is a transferable 
utility game, or TU-game, but in stead of rewards it depicts costs of coalitions. 
Because of the different interpretation, the definitions of standard properties and 
solution concepts for TU-games have to be adjusted. For the sake of completeness
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we provide the concepts tha t will be considered. The core of a cost-game (N, c) is 
defined by
C(c) := {x e  Rn  \ ^  x % =  c ( N ) and ^  x % < c (S ) for all S  C N }. 
ieN ies
A game with a non-empty core is called balanced. A TU-game is said to be totally 
balanced whenever every subgamel has a non-empty core. A cost-game (N, c) is 
said to be concave if c (S ) +  c (T ) — c(S  U T ) +  c(S  n  T ) for all S , T  C N . As is 
well-known, concavity of a cost-game implies (totally) balancedness.
The main goal of this paper is to prove tha t every processing game has a non-empty 
core. The core is generally considered to be a normative for an allocation to be fair, 
since no coalition can improve with respect to a core allocation.
We revisit Example 2.1 to show a processing game (N, cP ). It points out in partic­
ular that a processing game is in general not  concave and tha t there can be players 
to whom are assigned a negative cost (i.e., a reward) in any core allocation. As 
a result, solutions based on a proportional type of costs allocation with respect to 
processing demands and/or capacities will in general not  generate core allocations.
E x am p le  2.1 (co n tin u ed ). This time the three acres are owned by different 
farmers. Farmers 1 and 2 have small farms and no employees. Farmer 3 has 3 
employees.
In the processing situation comporting with the story, the player set N  consists of 
the players 1, 2 and 3 of which the processing demands are given by p  := (20, 30,10), 
the cost coefficients are given by a  := (24,30,6) and the individual capacities of the 
players are 3  := (1,1,4). Observe tha t the players are numbered in such a way that 
— — — — —. According to Proposition 2.2, the corresponding processing gamep1 p2 p3
(N, cP ) is given by 
cP (N ) =  I  [24-20 +  30-(20 +  30) +  6-(20 +  30 +  10)] =  390, 
cP ({1, 2}) =  990, cP ({1, 3}) =  132, cP ({2, 3}) =  228, 
cP ({1}) =  480, cP ({2}) =  900 and cP ({3}) =  15.
Observe tha t cP ( N ) +  cP ({2}) =  1290 > 1218 =  cP ({1, 2}) +  cP ({2, 3}), so the 
game is not concave. Furthermore, if x  e  C(cP ),
x l +  x 3 < 132, 
x 2 +  x 3 < 228, 
x l +  x 2 +  x 3 =  390.
1For each coalition S,  the subgame (S,  c \ s ) of (N,  c) is defined by c \s ( T ) =  c( T ) for all T  C S.
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Hence, 390 +  x 3 =  x 1 +  x 2 +  2 • x 3 < 360. As a result, this yields x 3 < 0. Note 
tha t player 3 is rewarded for his participation in every core allocation because of 
his relatively large capacity. It is left to the reader to verify tha t the allocation 
(195,310, —115) is contained in the core C(cP ). o
The core allocation of the example above has been found by applying the proof of 
the following theorem, which is the main result of this paper.
T h e o re m  3.1. A processing game is totally balanced. □
A proof can be found in Section 4, in which the allocation x  in RN, given by
i n n n
xi  •= w m  yi+ ~pN) • [ 2 •ai  + ^ a fc] —pPNt p n  • [2 'ak  +   ^
k=1 k=i+1 k=1 £=k+1
for all i £ N , will be proven to be a core allocation of the processing game {N, cP ), 
provided tha t N  := { 1 , . . .  , n }  and > . . .  >  ^ .
Let us give an interpretation of this core allocation. Since the urgencies are ordered 
in the way described above it is optimal for the grand coalition N  to first use the 
total capacity [3(N) on the job of player 1, then on the job of player 2 and so on. 
According to this schedule, player i has to wait for a period of time with length 
’PN)  ^ k = 1 Pk until his job has been completed. As a result his individual direct 
costs will be
i
ai • P7NT yiPk. (1)
k=1
If each player i would pay this amount, the costs are divided in an efficient way. 
It would not be very fair though. A player whose job is placed at the end of 
the line should be compensated. Furthermore, players who have a relatively large 
capacity /3i should be rewarded. For this reason, besides the actual costs (1), a 
tax is introduced on the jobs. The tax  proceeds then will be used to subsidize 
the players with large capacities. More particularly, the sum of the tax  deposits 
is redivided proportionally to the capacities of the players. We now explain the 
reasoning behind the explicit format of the tax  deposits. At each moment of time 
t, a cost-rate is introduced. The player whose job is in process must pay this rate. 
The cost-rate at time t  equals
y ,  a k • [the proportion of job j k tha t has not been finished yet at time t].
k£N
During a period of time with length p N ) , all players are working on the job of 
player i. Player i must pay a k • p N  for each player k whose job is still waiting
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to be processed. This is exactly the loss of player k because of the fact tha t the 
job of player i is processed before his own job. Additionally, player i has to pay
2 ' ai • ffiN) ’ since the mean proportion of his own job that has not been finished 
yet during its processing time equals | . The sum of these amounts equals the tax 
deposit Ti of player i:
n
Ti : =  ~0(pN) • [2 'ai  +  ^  afc] ■ (2)
k=i+1
Finally, the total amount of collected tax money is returned to the players, propor­
tional to their individual capacities. This yields a subsidy for player i of
n
«Nr y i Tk■ 
k=1
Subtracting expression (3) from the sum of the expressions (1) and (2), yields the 
amount player i has to pay according to the core allocation x:
i n
Xi := wN) Pk +  Ti -  WNry^y Tk, (4)
k=1 k=1
Let us return once more to the processing situation arising from Example 2.1.
E x am p le  2.1 (co n tin u ed ). Let {N, J ,p , a ,  3) be the processing situation with 
N  := {1, 2, 3}, J  := {31, 32, 33}, P := (20, 30,10), a  := (24, 30, 6) and 3  := (1,1, 4). 
The players are numbered in such a way tha t the optimal order is (1, 2, 3). We 
already stressed out that the allocation (195, 310, -115) is a core allocation of the 
corresponding processing game. This allocation arises as follows. The first part 
consists of the individual direct costs of (expression (1)) and equals 
24 • 1 • 20 =  80, 30 • 1 • 50 =  250 and 6 • 1 • 60 =  60-
The tax tha t the players have to pay is (expression (2))
t i  =  20 • [2 • 24 +  30 +  6] =  160, t2 =  30 • [2 • 30 +  6] =  105 and T3 =  10 • [± • 6] =  5-
According to expression (3) the players are subsidized
1 • [ t i  +  T2 +  T3] =45 ,  1 • [ t i  +  T2 +  T3] =  45 and 4 • [ t i  +  t2 +  T3] =  180
respectively. The core allocation x  becomes
(80 +  160 -  45 , 250 +  105 -  45 , 60 +  5 -  180) =  (195 , 310 , -115)- o
Observe tha t the direct costs as well as the tax  deposits are based on the given 
optimal order of decreasing urgencies. At first sight, the core allocation x  depends 
therefore on the optimal order chosen. The following proposition shows tha t this is 
not the case.
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P ro p o s itio n  3.2. Let (N ,J ,p ,a ,@ )  be a processing situation. The core allocation 
x  as given by (4) does not depend on the choice of which optimal order is used to 
process the jobs.
P roof: Two optimal orders be obtained from each other by a series of switches 
of two adjacent jobs with equal urgencies. It is sufficient to show tha t x  does not 
change at each of these switches. Assume tha t one optimal order is (1, . . .  ,n)  and 
tha t players i and i +  1 have equal urgencies: a  . We have to show that x  and
X coincide, with x  and X denoting the allocations which correspond to the orders 
(1, . . .  ,n) and (1, . . .  , i  — 1,i  +  1, i , i  +  2, .. . , n ) ,  where i and i +  1 have been switched, 
respectively. The vectors of taxes corresponding to these orders are denoted by t  
and T respectively.
We first show that the total amount of taxes paid in both orders is the same. Note 
tha t for players k  unequal to i and i +  1, the taxes Tk and Tk coincide. It is shown 
below tha t the sum of the taxes paid by i and i +  1 does not change either.
n
Ti + Ti+i — j N )  ( 2 a i +  X /  a )  +  I N ) ( 2 a ì+! +  X /  ae)
e=i+1 £=i+2
n n
— I N ) ( 2ai  +  ae)  + I N  ■ a i+i +  I N ( 2 a i+2 +  ae)
£=i+2 £=i+2 
n n
=  j Nn ) (1 a i +  Y  a e) +  ANN) • a i +  J$T)(1 a i+i +  Y  a e)
£=i+2 £=i+2
=  f i +  f i+l.
The third equality follows from the fact tha t i and i + 1  have equal urgencies. Since 
the total sum of amount of taxes is equal in both orders, it is immediately clear 
tha t x k =  x k for all k  unequal to i and i +  1. We now prove that x i =  Xi .
i n
xi  =  atm  yi+ Ti — wn )  Tk
k=1 k=1
n n
=  J N ) X /  Pk +  JpN) • a i+ 1 +  JpN) ( 2 ai  +  X /  a k ) JJN) X /  Tk 
k=1 k=i+2 k=1
i n
=  Pk +  J N)  • ai  +  fi — WN)  Tk
k=1 k=1
=  xi.
The third equality uses the fact tha t i and i +  1 have the same urgency. In the same 
way it can be proved tha t x i+ 1 and x i+ 1 coincide. □
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Because of this result, the allocation x  is uniquely determined by a, 3  and p. It is 
clear tha t x  is continuous in points with just one optimal order. Proposition 3.2 
shows that it is also continuous in points with more than one order.
C o ro lla ry  3.3. The core allocation x  is continuous in a, 3  and p.
Before closing this section we will look at a particular class of cost-games that can 
be derived from processing situations. As a result the games within this class are 
totally balanced.
E x am p le  3.1. Let N  be a set of players. Consider the situation in which all 
jobs have equal cost coefficients and equal processing times, say all of size 1. Let
3  e  r n  be a strictly positive vector. The corresponding processing situation yields 
the cost-game (N, c), defined by
c(S) := p S  • R l M + i l  for all S  Q N.
This can be easily verified by applying Proposition 2.2 (notice tha t all players have
urgency 1). In order to determine the core allocation x, any order can be used since
they are all optimal. If we choose the order (1, . . .  , n), the direct costs of player i
are p N ). His tax Ti equals p N ) ( 1 +  n  — i). The aggregate of the taxes E ieN Ti 
2
equals - iN r . Hence, for all i in N  we have2P(N) '
2
1'1 (n +  1 ) _ ___ n
P(N) (n +  2 ) p(N) 23 (N ) o
4 P roof of T heorem  3.1
Let us first give an outline of the proof. Given a processing situation, we construct 
an exchange economy and find a price equilibrium. This equilibrium is situated in 
the core of the economy. It induces a core allocation of the corresponding processing 
game. A similar technique has been used in Klijn, Tijs and Hamers (2000) to 
construct core elements of permutation games.
An (initially) empty agenda is given. It will be a two-dimensional commodity. Of 
course time is one dimension, the other one is effort per time unit. In principle, 
there is no time restriction. The amount of effort per time unit is bounded by the 
capacity f3(N) of the grand coalition. At each moment of time, one can buy any 
(measurable) part of the capacity available. Because of the two dimensions, it is 
customary to speak of land rather than of an agenda. So, we consider a Debreu- 
type of exchange economy (Debreu (1959)) in which each player initially owns a
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part of a perfectly divisible good, land. This type of economies has been studied 
in several papers (see for instance Legut, Potters and Tijs (1994)). In order to 
complete their jobs, players must make reservations in the agenda. Only if a player 
books a block of time and effort per time unit sufficiently large to process his job, 
it will be completed. A price is chosen such that the market clears, i.e., no part of 
the agenda is booked by more than one player. This gives rise to a feasible schedule 
F  £ F . Clearing the market will, as usual, lead to a price equilibrium, which is 
situated in the core of the exchange economy. It is converted to a core element of 
the processing game. This will end the proof.
Let ( N , J , p , a ,  3)  be a processing situation. Throughout this section we assume, 
without loss of generality, tha t N  =  { 1 , . . .  , n }  and that ^  > • • • > ^ .
Let E ( P ) := (N, (L, B, A), (Ai , Vi)ieN) be an exchange economy with land, in which:
•  A commodity, modelled by a measure space (L, B, A) has to be reallocated 
among the group of players N . Here, L  := [0, 3 ( N )] x R+ denotes a piece of 
land, B  is the Borel-a-algebra of L  and A : B  — > R+ denotes the Lebesgue- 
measure on L .
•  Each player i in N  has endowment  A i := [/3i] x  R+ in which [3i] denotes the 
interval [ E k<i 3 i , Y l k<i 3i]. Observe tha t U ieNAi  =  L  and A(Ai n  A k ) =  0 
whenever i =  k .
•  Each player i has reservation value Vi (B)  for all sets B  in B  defined by
Vi(B)  := — a i T i ( B ) ,
in which Ti (B)  := inf{t £  R+ | J0 f J (N ) 1B (x ,T ) dxdT > pi }. Here, 1B(•) is 
the indicator-function of set B. Ti (B)  denotes the moment of time at which 
the job of player i will be finished in the case tha t part B  of the land (agenda) 
is used to work on his job. In case subset B  is not sufficient, Ti (B)  equals 
infinity.
•  Player i has a quasi-linear utility funct ion Ui : B x  R — > R tha t denotes his 
valuation for bundles of land and money. It is defined by
Ui ( B ,y )  := Vi (B)  +  y  for all B  £ B  and y £  R.
Let S  C N  be a coalition. An S-redistribution is a set { B i }ieS of A-measurable 
subsets of L, with (JieSB i C (JieSA i and A(Bi n  B j ) =  0 whenever i =  j .  Let 
{ B i }i^S be an S -redistribution and z  £  RS such that E ^ s  zi =  0. Then the set 
{ (B i , z i)} ieS is called an S-reallocation.
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If {(B i , Zi)}ieN is an N -reallocation then an 5-reallocation {(Ci, yi)} i£S is called an 
improvement  upon { (B i , z i)} ieN if Vi (Ci) +  yi > Vi (B i) +  zi for all i in S . An N - 
reallocation { (B i , z i)} ieN is a core reallocation if no coalition S  has an improvement 
upon {(Bi ,Zi)} iEN .
An N -reallocation { (B i , z i)} ieN is called a price equilibrium if there exists a price 
density function n  : L  — > R such that
(i) Pn (Bi) +  zi =  Pn (A i) for all i G N , (budget constraints)
(ii) If Vi (C ) +  y > Vi (B i) +  z i for certain C ç  L, y G R and i G N ,
then Pn(C ) +  y > Pn (Ai), (maximality conditions)
in which Pn (B) := f ^ “ f f (N) 1B (x, t )  n ( x , t )  dxd t  for all B  ç  L.
Given an exchange economy with land E ( P ) we define a TU-game ( N , v £(p)) with 
the value for coalition S  ç  N  as follows:
v£ p  )(S ) := s u p { £  Vi (Ci) | {Ci} ieS is an S-redistribution },
i£S
i.e., the maximum social welfare in the sub-economy in which only the actions of 
the players in coalition S  are considered.
The TU-game {N ,v £p )) is in fact the TU-game {N, - c p ), as the following lemma 
demonstrates.
L em m a 4.1. vE(p)(S) =  - c p (S) fo r  all S  ç  N .
P ro o f. Take S  ç  N , say S  := {i(1), . . . ,  i(s)}  with i(1) < . . .  < i(s). Define, for all 
j  with 1 < j  < s:,
B j  :=  .U[A] x p(S) ' p i(j)],
in which [pi(j )] denotes the interval [E e<jPi(e)^Yl<jPi(e)] with length pi(j).
Clearly, { B j } «  is an S -redistribution. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that
5
% (P )(S ) =  £  Vi(j)(Bj ). 
j =1
vs  (p)(S) =  £  Vi(j)(Bj ) =  - £  a j  ■ T  (Bj  ) 
j= i j= i 
5
=  - Y i s [pi(i) + . . . + pi(j)] =  - cP(S ) . D 
j =1
Hence,
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The following lemma provides a relation between the existence of a price equilibrium 
in the exchange economy E ( P ) and the non-emptiness of the core of the TU-game 
(N,  —cP ). In fact, using a standard argument, one can show tha t if { (B i} z i)} ieN is 
a price equilibrium, then the corresponding vector (Vi (B i) +  zi )ieN is contained in 
the core C(—cP). For the sake of completeness, we provide a proof.
L em m a 4.2. I f  the exchange economy E ( P ) has a price equilibrium, then the TU­
game (N, —cP ) has a non-empty core. □
P ro o f. Let { (B i , z i)} ieN be a price equilibrium supported by the price density 
function n  : L  — > R. We prove that the vector (Vi (B i) +  zi)ieN is contained in the 
core C(—cP ) of the TU-game (N, —cP ).
Suppose there exists a coalition S  C N  such that
£ ( V i ( B i ) +  Zi) < —cP (S). 
ies
Let {Ci }ieS be an S-redistribution such tha t vE(p)(S) =  —cP ( S ) =  E ^ s  Vi (Ci) 
and define, for all i in S ,
yi :=  Vi (B i) +  zi — Vi (Ci) +  ]Sj [Vi (Ci) — Vi (B i) — zi].
ies
It is straightforward to verify tha t the S -reallocation {(Ci ,y i) } ieS is an improve­
ment upon the price equilibrium { (B i} z i)} ieN . Hence, according to the maximality 
conditions, this yields
Pn (Ci) +  yi > Pn (Ai) for all i e  S.
Taking the sum over all i in S  yields the desired contradiction. □
So, the existence of a price equilibrium in E (P ) implies balancedness of the TU­
game (N, —cP) and thus also balancedness of the cost-game (N, cP). Therefore, the 
proof of Theorem 3.1 boils down to the following proposition.
P ro p o s itio n  4.3. The exchange economy with land E ( P ) has a price equilibrium.
P ro o f. Denote [pj] as the interval [J2j<i Pj^J2j<i Pj] with length pi for all i in N  
and define
* t )  := { |  f  t I P{ o if t  > J 2 j e N  Pj .
Observe tha t n  : R+ — > R+ is weakly decreasing.
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Define the N -reallocation { (B i , z i)} ieN , by 
Bi  := [0 ,p (N )] x [pi],
z i :=  — W N  •[ 2 • a i +  a i+l +  . . .  +  a n] +  fl(NT WNo •[ 2 • a j +  a j+ l +  . . .  +  a n].
jeN
Furthermore, we define the price density function n  : L  — > R by
H ( t  )dr.
We prove tha t the N -reallocation { (B i} z i )} ieN is a price equilibrium supported by 
this price density function.
For all i in N  we have
{' {' W(N)
Pn (Bi) = 1 Bi (x , t )  • n ( x , t ) d x d t
Jo Jo 
r rW(N)
= n ( x , t )  dxdt
J [pi]J o
/*
=  w m  ^ ( t  )dT dt j[pi]j t
2
Pi • [^  y pj — t] +  a i+l +  . . .  +  a ndt
J\Pi] iW(N) ]M j<i
WM ( a i £  Pj — 2 K • [(£  Pj )2 — ^ 2  Pj )2] +  Pi • [ai+2 +  . . .  +  “ ra]) 
j<i j<i j<i
307) Pj — 2 I3(N)-Pi • [p2 +  2 •Pi X /  Pj] +  W N  • [ai+ 2 +  . . .  +  an] 
j<i j<i
("N) •[2 a i +  a i+l +  . . .  +  a n].W( ) I- 2
Similarly, we have for all i in N
r <x> r W(N)
Pn(Ai) = lA i (x , t )  • n(x ,  t) dxdt
Oo Oo 
/*
= / n(x, t) dxdt
Oo ./[ft]
=  Jo i N 1 J  V (T )dT dt
/* rtt
m Y .  r n  I  ^ ( t ) dTdt^ at J\vj y  t)jeN [pj ]
wwy ' Y l t  w w  •[ 2 'a j  +  a j + 2 + . . .  +  ° n].
jeN
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Pn (Bi) +  zi =  Pn (Ai).
Hence, the budget constrains are satisfied. Now we prove tha t the maximality 
conditions also hold. To obtain a contradiction, suppose there exists C C L, y e  R 
and i e  N  such that
Vi(C) +  y > Vi(Bi) +  zi and Pn (C) +  y < P n ( A ) .
Because Pn (A i) =  Pn (B i) +  zi , these two inequalities yield
Vi(C) — Pn (C) > Vi(Bi) — Pn(Bi).  (5)
Since the price density function n(x,  t) does not depend on x  and is decreasing in t 
we can assume without loss of generality tha t C  := Ct =  [0, 3 ( N )] x [t, t  +  pi] for a 
certain number t. Define the function f  : R+ — > R by
/ t+pi r xJ  MC)d(dT.
Observe tha t f  is differentiable on R+ and
r x  r x
fl(t) =  — w7vy — wtN) [ l ( Z  )dZ — ^ (Z )dZ ]t+pi t
/ t+Pi K (  )d(.
Hence, f 1 is also differentiable on R+ and f  ll(t) =  w(Ny [^(t +  pi) — ^(t)] < 0. This 
inequality follows from the fact fi is weakly decreasing. So, f  is a concave function. 
Therefore its maximal value is taken in t  whenever f l(t ) =  0. Hence, f  takes its 
maximal value in the point t  :=Y1 j<i Pj . Therefore,
f  (t) < f  ( £ Pj) =  Vi(Bi) — Pn(Bi)  for all t  e  R+.
j<i
This contradicts equation (5) and as a result it follows tha t the N -reallocation 
{ (B i} z i)} ieN is a price equilibrium supported by the price density function n. □
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is now straightforward.
P ro o f  o f T h e o re m  3.1. Because the exchange economy with land E ( P ) has a price 
equilibrium, the TU-game (N, —cP ) has according to Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 a 
non-empty core. This means there exists a vector x  in RN such that x ( N ) =  —cP ( N ) 
and x ( S ) > —cP ( S ) for all S  C N . Equivalently, there exists a vector x  in RN such 
tha t x ( N ) =  cP ( N ) and x(S) < cP ( S ) for all S  C N . Hence, the cost-game (N, cP ) 
is balanced.
This yields, for all i in N ,
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The reason for the cost-game (N, cP ) to be totally balanced, is the fact that the 
processing game restricted to a coalition S  C N  is again a processing game and 
thus balanced.
According to Lemma 4.2, we also obtain for the vector — (Vi (B i) +  z i)ieN, in which 
B i and zi are defined for all i in N  as in the proof of Proposition 4.3, to be a core 
allocation in the cost-game (N, cP ). Verifying this expression provides the core 
allocation stated below Theorem 3.1. □
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